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Abstract. For years security machine learning research has promised to
obviate the need for signature based detection by automatically learning
to detect indicators of attack. Unfortunately, this vision hasn’t come to
fruition: in fact, developing and maintaining today’s security machine
learning systems can require engineering resources that are comparable
to that of signature-based detection systems, due in part to the need
to develop and continuously tune the “features” these machine learning
systems look at as attacks evolve. Deep learning, a subfield of machine
learning, promises to change this by operating on raw input signals and
automating the process of feature design and extraction. In this paper
we propose the eXpose neural network, which uses a deep learning ap-
proach we have developed to take generic, raw short character strings as
input (a common case for security inputs, which include artifacts like po-
tentially malicious URLs, file paths, named pipes, named mutexes, and
registry keys), and learns to simultaneously extract features and clas-
sify using character-level embeddings and convolutional neural network.
In addition to completely automating the feature design and extraction
process, eXpose outperforms manual feature extraction based baselines
on all of the intrusion detection problems we tested it on, yielding a 5%-
10% detection rate gain at 0.1% false positive rate compared to these
baselines.
1 Introduction
While for over a decade researchers have proposed systems that apply machine
learning methods to computer security detection problems, this research has
gained only limited prevalence in real-world security systems, in part, we believe,
because machine learning systems require significant expert effort to develop and
maintain.
For example, development of machine learning based security detection sys-
tems requires an in-depth exploration of the feature representation of a given
security artifact type (e.g. Windows PE binaries, URLs, or behavioral traces),
and an exploration of what machine learning detection approaches yield the best
accuracy given those representations. As cyber-attacks evolve, machine learning
feature representations must be updated to keep pace with the latest cyber
threats. The calculation of many computer security products companies is often
that signature based systems are thus a less risky investment.
While many technical problems stand in the way of effective deployment of
machine learning systems (e.g. the collection of large volumes of labeled training
data, the problem of evaluating these systems when attacker behavior is con-
stantly changing, and the problem of deploying complex models of low-resource
endpoints), one way to reduce the cost of creating and maintaining machine
learning approaches is to move beyond manual feature engineering, given that
feature engineering is often recognized as the most time consuming aspect of ma-
chine learning system development. Deep learning, a subfield of machine learning
that utilizes neural networks operating directly on raw inputs, promises to allow
us to do this.
In line with this vision, we present eXpose, a deep learning approach to
a number of security detection problems, that directly works on raw inputs to
detect maliciousness. Specifically, eXpose takes generic short character strings as
its input and learns to detect whether they are indicators of malicious behavior
based on their lexical semantics. In this paper, we demonstrate eXpose’s ability
to detect malicious URLs, malicious file paths, and malicious registry keys.
To make our research objectives clear, below are examples of these data,
starting with malicious URLs (we’ve substituted URL forward slashes for back-
slashes to avoid accidental clicks):
http:\\0fx8o.841240.cc\201610\18\content_23312\svchost.exe
http:\\31.14.136.202\secure.apple.id.login\Apple\login.php
http:\\1stopmoney.com\paypal-login-secure\websc.php
Next, a few examples of malicious file paths:
C:\Temp\702D97503A79B0EC69\JUEGOS/Call of Duty 4+Keygen
C:\Temp\svchost.vbs
C:\DOCUME~1\BASANT~1\LOCALS~1\Temp\WzEC.tmp\fax.doc.exe
Finally, a few examples of malicious registry keys:
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run Alpha Antivirus
HKCR\Applications\WEBCAM HACKER 1.0.0.4.EXE
HKCR\AppID\bccicabecccag.exe
All of these examples appear malicious, or at least suspicious, to the expert
eye, leading us to hypothesize that a machine learning system could also infer
their maliciousness. It might even be possible to exceed human expert’s ability
to guess whether these artifacts are malicious, by learning to recognize gener-
alized deceptive patterns observed over tens of millions of malicious artifacts.
And indeed, on all of the intrusion detection problems we tested, eXpose out-
performed manual feature extraction based machine learning baselines, yielding
a 5%-10% higher detection rate at deployment relevant false positive rates. Our
research demonstrates the potential deep learning methods hold solving hard
security detection problems.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we describe related
work. In Section 3 we motivate and describe our eXpose approach, including
an exact and reproducible description of our system. Section 4 describes our
evaluation methodology and results. Finally, in section 5 we sum up the paper
and discuss directions for future work.
2 Previous Work
2.1 Related work in computer security
We designed eXpose as a fairly generic detection tool that simultaneously ad-
dresses a number of cybersecurity problems. This is somewhat different from
previous work, which tends to focus on individual security detection problems,
such as identifying malicious URLs or malicious host-based behavior individu-
ally. In this section we place our work in conversation with current cybersecurity
literature and describe its relationship to the broader deep learning literature.
A number of previous works in machine learned based behavioral detection of
malware is related to automatic classification of individual file paths or registry
keys. In general, previous behavioral malware detection methods have focused
on making detections on the basis of sequences of observed process or oper-
ating system-level events. For example, [3] proposes a logistic regression-based
method for detecting malware infections based on n-grams of audit log event
observations. Relatedly, [1] proposes to use an anomaly detection approach on
sequences of registry accesses to infer whether a host has been compromised. [6]
surveys a wide variety of behavioral malware detection techniques, all of which
perform manual feature engineering on collections of events to infer whether or
not dynamically executed binaries are malicious or benign.
Unlike the work summarized above, which operates on groups of dynamic
host-based observations to detect malware, eXpose operates on individual events,
but rather than modeling individual host-based events using manually defined
feature representations, eXpose learns representations of input strings (e.g. file
paths and registry keys) as part of its overall process of learning to make ac-
curate detections of malicious behavior. We thus think of eXpose as providing
a complementary and orthogonal detection capability relative to these research
efforts.
Unlike individual file and registry writes, identifying malicious URLs is a
more studied problem in the security detection literature. Proposed malicious
URL detection approaches have tended to either exclusively use URL strings
as their input or utilize both URL strings and supplementary information like
website registration services, website content, and network reputation [14]. In
contrast to work that uses both input URLs and auxiliary information to detect
malicious URLs, our work relies solely on URL input strings, making it easier
to deploy.
With respect to the detection mechanism used in previous URL detection
work, the simplest proposed approaches have involved blacklists, which can
be collected using manual labeling, user feedback, client honeypots, and other
heuristics [10]. While blacklists have a very low false positive rate, they are also
very brittle and thus cannot generalize to previously unseen URL strings [26]. To
address these limitations, statistical approaches, such as machine-learning or sim-
ilarity based URL detection have been proposed [14]. Unfortunately, manually
discovering potentially useful features is time consuming and requires constant
adaptation to evolving obfuscation techniques, which limits the achievable accu-
racy of the detectors. In contrast to work that requires manual feature extraction
from URLs to make detections, our work automates this feature extraction pro-
cess.
2.2 Machine Learning
Convolutional Neural Networks eXpose uses neural network convolutional
kernels as part of its approach to automating feature engineering and extraction,
and so in addition to computer security literature focused on detecting cyber at-
tacks, our work is also related to the convolutional neural network and recurrent
neural network literature in machine learning.
Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN) [18,19] have been applied to image
recognition problems for a long time, but only fairly recently have they demon-
strated breakthrough results in image recognition [17]. The advantage of CNNs
over previous approaches is that they work directly on the raw pixel data, thus
eliminating tedious and fairly limited hand designing of features. What makes
CNNs particularly powerful for images is that they are able to efficiently exploit
information locality by applying convolutional operations on a raw data using a
set of different kernels. These kernels are learned jointly with the entire network,
and thus are better able to adapt to learning objectives than hand designed de-
signed kernels. Since the same kernel is applied to every pixel of the image, there
is a tremendous reduction in parameters that need to be learned, as compared
to a fully dense neural network.
In addition to targeting image inputs, CNNs have also found rich applica-
tions within natural language processing, where they are typically applied to
subsequences of words or patterns such that they perform pattern matching on
sequential patterns within input texts. For example, [24] proposes to combine
a word embedding approach with a convolutional neural network to perform
sentiment analysis on Twitter data.
Other authors propose machine learning approaches that operate on charac-
ter level embeddings [23,15,30]. The advantage of such approaches is that they do
not require syntactical understanding of the language, such as word boundaries
or punctuation. This work is closely to related to our own, since we also model
text strings at the character level, embedding them in an embedding space and
then extracting features using convolutions. To our knowledge, our approach is
the first computer security detector to take this approach or any approach that
extracts features from raw inputs.
Recurrent Neural Networks RNNs are commonly used to process sequen-
tial information, with LSTM based approaches being among the more popular
[9]. While theoretically they are able to learn long terms dependencies in a se-
quences, RNNs are problematic to train due to the vanishing gradient problem
as well as large computational cost because of the need to sequentially back
and forward propagate information during training and prediction phases [8].
Recently CNN have been shown to be just (if not more) effective on sequen-
tial data oriented modeling problems, while allowing a significantly faster model
training and prediction evaluation [13].
Multi-task Learning Multi-task learning using neural networks is a some-
what related idea to our generalized CNN model. There, a set of network layers
is shared between various related learning tasks, and an individualized set of
final layers is used to make the final prediction on the specific task [4]. Sharing
internal weights potentially allows the network to learn a richer representation of
the data, which is especially useful when individual datasets are very small [2].
Another advantage of multi-task learning is if a set of related classifiers needs
to be deployed to an endpoint, weight-sharing provides a smaller deployment
footprint.
Multi-task learning has also been suggested for malware detection by simul-
taneously trying to predict binary classification as well as malware family [11].
However, multi-task learning does not directly map to our set of detection prob-
lems, where the semantic meaning of the characters and substrings significantly
changes between problems. Furthermore, our labeled dataset is of virtually un-
limited size, making training on combined datasets less useful.
3 Method
eXpose is built on the premise that applying a neural network directly to the raw
input of short character strings provides better classification accuracy than pre-
vious approaches that rely on hand-designed features. In this section we describe
how we architected our neural network to operate directly on raw character in-
put, and the intuition behind our decisions. Our network was implemented in
Python 2.7 using Keras v1.1 [5].
3.1 Architecture
Fig. 1 gives an intuitive overview of our approach, showing that our neural net-
work is divided into three notional components 3: character embedding, feature
detection, and a classifier.
The character embedding component embeds the alphabet of printable English-
language characters into a multi-dimensional feature space, thus encoding an
input string’s sequence of raw characters as a two-dimensional tensor.
Using this tensor, the feature detection component detects important local
sequence patterns within the full character sequence, and then aggregates this
information into a fixed-length feature vector.
Finally, the classification component classifies the detected features using
a dense neural network. All of these components are optimized jointly using
stochastic gradient descent. Fig. 2 gives a formal diagram of our neural network
architecture, which we also describe step by step in the text below.
Character Embedding Our model starts its computational flow with the raw
length s sequence of characters and embeds them into an s ×m floating point
matrix. This operation is a simply dictionary lookup, where each character,
irrespective of the characters that came before it or after it, is mapped to its
corresponding vector, and then these vectors are concatenated into this matrix.
The matrix’s rows represent the sequence of characters in the original string,
and the matrix’s columns represent the dimensions of the embedding space.
Embedding layer is optimized jointly with the rest of the model through back-
propagation, optimizing the individual characters’ embedding vectors to be more
reflective of their semantic meaning, resulting in pairs of semantically similar
characters being embedded closer to each other if they have similar attributes
(e.g. they are both uppercase, both control control characters, etc.) [15]. This
clustering of semantically similar characters makes it similar for the lower layers
to identify semantically similar patterns in the string.
In our implementation we set s = 200 and m = 32. For our URL-based ex-
periments we use an input vocabulary of the 87 URL-valid characters, and for
our file path and registry key experiments we use an input vocabulary of the
100 valid printable characters. Any unicode we encounter in our experiments we
wildcard with a lower-case ‘x’, reserving more sophisticated handling of interna-
tional characters for future work. We set maximum string length on all artifacts
to 200 since this is around the 95th percentile or greater of all strings in our
experimental URL, file path, and registry datasets. If the string is shorter than
3 What we mean here is that our overall model is most easily understood as containing
three separate components, each focused on a somewhat different task. We used this
notional hierarchy when developing our networks architecture. It is important to
note, however, that the entire model is simultaneously optimized, end-to-end, and
thus all components are optimized for the singular classification task. We can think of
the entire model as some complex classifier, or alternatively, a deep feature extractor,
followed by a logistic regression.
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Fig. 1. An intuitive overview of the neural network architecture of our model.
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Fig. 2. The neural network architecture of our CNN model.
200, we pad it with a special null symbol in the front. If the string is longer
than 200, we cutoff the beginning of the string. We empirically determined that
m = 32 provides a good tradeoff between accuracy and computational com-
plexity. Note that 32 is much smaller then the potential 87-sized or 100-sized
one-hot-encoding of these same characters, which is a common way to represent
categorical input in machine learning models.
We visually demonstrate that our trained model does indeed learn seman-
tically related embedding in Fig. 3, where we show a two-dimensional MDS
projection of our learned embeddings. As the Fig. 3 shows, letters with simi-
lar semantics tend to cluster together, with upper case letters appearing near
other upper case letters, lowercase letters near other lowercase letters, tilde, a
highly important character in the URL case falling into its own cluster, etc. The
fact that our character vectors cluster in this way suggests that our embedding
representation is capturing their semantic meaning.
Feature Detection Once we embed our input into an s×m matrix, the next
step is extracting and aggregating locally detected features. This is done in two
stages: in the first stage we detect local features by applying multiple kernel
convolutions, Conv(t, k, n), and in the second stage we aggregate the results
across the entire sequence by summing the kernels’ activations using SumPool.
We define both Conv and SumPool formally in our appendix. These steps are
done separately for each k ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5}, and we empirically set t = 256. The
four results for each k tower are then concatenated together into a 1024 length
vector.
The t filters in our CNN spans the entire length of the character embedding
m, and can be thought of as sliding of convolution kernels (or masks) over the
sequence of character embeddings. The motivation for using convolutions as our
feature extraction component flows from similar approaches in natural language
processing (NLP) [30].
Computing convolutions on raw character embedding matrix is conceptually
similar to traditional bag-of-words approaches. The main conceptional differ-
ence is that rather than directly detecting n-grams, we allow for “approximate”
matches on semantically similar substrings.
In this manner of thinking, each convolutional filter is responsible for detect-
ing a distinct set of similar sequential patterns, and by summing up its activa-
tions over a text string, we obtain the degree to which these patterns occurs in
the full string, similar to a bag-of-words aggregating all the n-grams. Just like
the n-gram approach, our approach is robust to insertions and deletions within
the character-string, as subsequences can occur anywhere in the string and still
be detected by the convolution.
Normalization and Regularization To speed up model training and prevent
overfitting, we use layer-wise BatchNorm and Dropout(0.5) (0.2 for registry keys)
between layers (see Fig. 2 for details). We define both BatchNorm and Dropout in
our appendix below. We found that layer-wise normalization gave better results
than the more popular batch normalization [12], and that putting the normaliza-
tion after the activation gave equivalent results to putting it before each units
activation function. We also found that without regularization our model can
easily overfit our training data, even when training on millions of samples.
Classification Once we extract the features, we use a standard dense neural
network to classify the string as malicious or benign. The dense neural network
has two layers, a Dense(l) unit, followed by the DenseSigmoid(l) layer with
l = 1024 units. We define both Dense and DenseSigmoid in our appendix below.
The dense layers learn a non-linear kernel given the convolution based features,
and the sigmoid layer output provides the probability that the input string is
malicious given the output of the final dense layer. We measure our detector’s
prediction loss using binary-cross entropy,
L(yˆ,y) = −
1
N
N∑
i
[yi log yˆi + (1 − yi) log(1 − yˆi)] (1)
where yˆ is our model’s prediction probability vector for all the URL samples and
y is the vector of true label (0 for benign, and 1 for malicious). We use Adam
[16] method to minimize eq. (1).
Typically, it is much easier to collect benign than malicious data, resulting
in highly imbalanced dataset. Rather than simply reweighing individual values
to equalize the overall contribution of the benign and malware in eq. (1), we ad-
justed the benign to malware ratio directly during batch streaming. We generate
256-sized batch by first randomly sampling the full dataset of benign samples
and randomly selected 128 samples, and then repeating the same approach for
128 malware samples. This effectively created an even class balance between
malicious and benign data in our training dataset, with a more diverse repre-
sentation of each class than simple reweighting of individual samples. We count
one epoch as having processed 4096 batches, and train for 100 epochs.
For our final solution we select the best overall model, determined by largest
area under the ROC (AUC) for the time-split validation.
Alternatives Attempted
During the development of our current architecture we have also tried several
alternative architectures that did not yield better performance, and/or where
computationally too expensive:
– Replacing regular convolutions with a series of dilated convolutions [29,13].
– Stacking embeddings, convolutions, and a long short term memory recurrent
layer [22].
– Stacked convolutions to learn non-linear convolutional activations [28].
– ResNet type stacking of convolutions [7]
4 Results
We evaluate our model against two baseline approaches, described below, on
three different problems. The first problem involves identifying malicious URLs
directly from the URL string. For this problem we downloaded 19067879 unique
URLs, randomly sampled over a roughly two month period, from VirusTotal.
For the second and third problem, identifying malicious registry key and
file paths, we extracted over 18 million Cuckoo sandbox runs, as recorded on
VirusTotal, and utilized all the observed file and registry writes and creations.
This gave us 5590614 unique file paths, and 1661716 registry key paths. We give
a detailed breakdown of these data in Table 1.
Table 1. Numbers of artifacts in our research datasets
Type
Training Testing
Benign Malicious Benign Malicious
URLs 7211705 1496198 9718748 641228
File Paths 869836 3677404 359796 683578
Registry Keys 250819 1282292 43437 85168
4.1 Labeling
Training and evaluating eXpose’s performance requirs assigning a binary label to
every artifact in our experimental datasets indicating whether it is malicious or
benign. We label URL artifacts we used a voting approach, in which we assigned
a label to the URL based on the score given by 59 anti-virus engines. If 5 or more
of these engines assigned a “malicious” label to a URL we considered it malicious,
and if no engines assigned a “malicious” label to a URL we labeled it benign.
We discarded URLs with 1 to 4 anti-virus engine detections. Our motivation is
that URLs may or may not be benign or malicious, and this uncertainty would
introduce label noise into both the training of our model and our validation of
its accuracy.
Since registry keys and file paths can be ambiguous (e.g., both malware and
benignware can write to same path), we took a different approach for labeling
file and registry key paths. First, we labeled our corpus of binaries as either
malicious or benign using a voting technique over an ensemble of 60 anti-virus
engines, where binaries that had 5 or more anti-virus based detections were
labeled as malicious and binaries that had 0 detections were labeled as benign.
We then discarded binaries with between 1 and 4 detections from our dataset, as
we regarded the question of whether these binaries were malicious or benign as
ambiguous. Next we inspected the behavioral traces of the resulting 18 million
binaries, counting how often each unique file path or registry key was created or
written to in both benign and malicious sandbox runs. Finally, we labeled any
file paths or registry keys that only occurred in malicious contexts as malicious,
and labeled the other artifacts (benign or partially cases) as benign.
4.2 Baseline Models
We implemented two baseline models, one is standard general feature n-gram
extractor, where we pool out a set of all possible 1-5 sized n-grams. The second
model, used only for URLs, is based on manually extracted features described
in [20]. These features include common sense statistics like: URL length, the
number of ‘.’ separators in a URL, and categorical lexical features like domain
name and URL suffix tokens. Combined together, they form a very large, but
sparse feature vector.
To make training tractable at the scale of millions of examples, we use the
feature hashing trick to randomly hash these features into 1024-dimensional
vectors. Our motivation for picking a dimensionality of 1024 was two-fold. First,
in order to tractably train our baseline models on millions of URL examples,
a small feature vector is optimal. Second, given that the output of our novel
models feature extraction is 1024 dimensional, we were interested in comparing
a conventional 1024-dimensional representation of URLs with our deep learn-
ing representation, thereby answering the question, which representation is the
richest representation for performing malicious URL detection?
The above hashed features are fed directly into a deep MLP model. This MLP
model is identical to our novel neural network model, except that we’ve stripped
off the deep learning feature extraction layers, and replaced the input they pro-
vide with our manually constructed 1024-dimensional feature vector. This design
is intended to highlight the potential contribution of our convolutional feature
extractor in improving detection accuracy.
4.3 Evaluation
We present our results using a ROC curve between true positive and false posi-
tives rates. This measure is independent of the ratio of benign to malware in our
dataset, and so is simplest to interpret. We focus on the low FPR rates 10−4 and
10−3, which from our experience represent a reasonable deployment threshold.
The ROC curves for all three problems are shown in Fig. 3, and the specific
values are given in Table 2.
In addition to the ROC curves, we also present the two dimensional PCA
projection of the normalized embedding vectors for the all individual charac-
ters in Fig. 3. The capital letters, lowercase letters, numbers tend to cluster
together, while important special symbols like “/” and ”?” are fairly separated
from the rest of the character. The results support our intuition behind insert-
ing the embedding layer to provide a richer n-gram like detection, by clustering
semantically similar characters together.
Our results show that across the board convolution feature extraction out-
performs other approaches. For example, at FPR 10−3 eXpose has 6% higher
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Fig. 3. Results for URLs, file paths, and registry keys. Top row shows 2D PCA pro-
jection of the normalized character embeddings. Bottom row shows the ROC curve for
various models.
detection rate than n-gram or expert derived features, with even larger improve-
ment on file paths and registry keys problems. The fact that our tuned expert
features are not able to outperform n-grams is potentially explain by our large
dataset size. This is consistent with the well observed fact in the fields of NLP
[25] and bioinformatics [21], that a bag of n-grams is a highly effective repre-
sentation in itself. The fact that the convolutional network is able to exceed
n-gram performance in this large dataset setting suggest that embeddings with
convolutional networks can be used as powerful automatic feature extractor.
The overall results for the file paths and registry keys problem are worse
than for URLs. This is not surprising because of the difficulty of properly labeling
samples. Recall that our approach was to label any sample that had 0 occurrences
in malware data as benign, and everything else was labeled malware. However,
estimating if the probability sample being 0 is difficult because typically there
is only one observation of the string in the datasets. Furthermore, file paths and
registry keys have significantly less training data, which in our experience can
significantly decrease our model’s generalizability.
While our CNN model outperform the n-gram model, one potential expla-
nation is that there are too many collisions in the 1024-sized vector caused by
feature hashing. Conversely, the vector is too large for the neural network to
capture good relationships between the features. Therefore, we have also done
the n-gram experiment with 512 and 2048-sized feature vector. These n-gram
Table 2. Validation results
Task TPR (at various FPRs) AUC
10−4 10−3 10−2
URLs
Convnet 0.77 0.84 0.92 0.993
N-gram 0.76 0.78 0.84 0.985
Expert 0.74 0.78 0.84 0.985
File Paths
Convnet 0.16 0.43 0.68 0.978
N-gram 0.18 0.33 0.65 0.972
Registry Keys
Convnet 0.51 0.62 0.86 0.992
N-gram 0.11 0.49 0.72 0.988
experiments yielded worse results than the 1024-sized result, and so are not
shown.
We note that, potentially, extensive re-architecture of the n-gram’s neural
network or switching to a different ML approach could yield better results
than we presented. Furthermore, feature importance values, as computed using
mutual information between label and individual feature vectors, L1 logistic-
regression, random forest, or related methods can be used to significantly reduce
the number of n-gram features that are hashed into the vector, thus also po-
tentially improving results. The downside is that these methods in themselves
require significant amount of tuning and multiple passes through a very large
dataset. The advantage of our end-to-end learning is that we work directly with
raw data, and so can simply utilize the same loading of samples in small batches
no matter the architecture. With this approach is no a priori loss of information
that is inherent in features engineering, enabling very rapid prototyping.
5 Conclusions
We developed and demonstrated the first, to our knowledge, convolutional neu-
ral network for extracting automatic features from short string in the context of
cybersecurity problems. Using embeddings with convolutions as top layers in our
neural network coupled with supervised training, allows us to implicitly extract a
feature set that is directly optimized for classification. While similar approaches
have been suggested for NLP, eXpose is the first approach that demonstrates how
top to bottom deep-learning method can be adapted to several important cy-
bersecurity problems in an adversarial environment, where strings are purposely
obfuscated to prevent obvious feature extraction.
One of the major issues during our experimentation was the computational
cost of training on longer strings, that prevented us from trying more com-
plex architectures. With current advances in hardware and distributed training
modules added to modern frameworks, our results can potentially be further
improved with some of the more computationally expensive architecture that
we were unable to try.
Looking forward, we hope that ideas integrated into eXpose will help guide
the security industry into moving away from expensive feature engineering to
directly utilizing already existing labeled datasets for end-to-end learning. As
hardware and available datasets improve, the difference between automatically
extracted features and traditional feature extraction approaches will only get
starker.
Appendix
5.1 Components
Our convolutional neural network is implemented in Python 2.7 using Keras v1.1
[5]. Below we describe our model’s pre-defined set of components (or layers),
which are described in terms of Keras build-in layers documented online:
Embedding(s,m) An embedding layer that takes in a list of s integers repre-
senting the URL character list (each unique character is mapped to an associated
unique integer in the range [1, |Σ|]), and outputs a matrix of floating points,
where each original scalar integer value is represented by an m dimensional em-
bedding vector. |Σ| is the size of the alphabet used to express the URLs. This
operation is defined in Keras as Embedding(input dim=s)
Conv(t, k, n) A filter bank of t k-length one dimensional convolution kernels
that convolve n adjacent m dimensional vectors, and are immediately followed
by a non-linear ReLU activation. Defined in Keras as
Convolution1D(t, k, input shape=(s,m)), followed by Activation(relu). Note, we
drop m in our notation, since it can be inferred from the previous layer, or
otherwise defined in the text.
BatchNorm Layer-wise batch normalization. Defined in Keras as
BatchNormalization(mode=1).
SumPool Sum of the input along the input length s, such that the out-
put size is k, given the input size (s, k). The operation is defined in Keras as
Lambda(f, output shape=(k, )), where f(X) = K.sum(X, axis=1).
Dropout(p) Dropout with probability p [27]. Defined in Keras as Dropout(p).
Merge A merge operation that takes output from a previous set of layers,
{k1, k2, k3, k4}, and concatenates them into a single matrix,
[
k1, k2, k3, k4
]T
. De-
fined in Keras as Merge(...,mode = ”concat”).
Dense(l) A fully connected linear unit with output size l, followed by a ReLU
non-linear activation. Defined in Keras as Dense(l), followed by Activation(relu).
DenseSigmoid Last layer used to generate a binary decisions. Same as Dense(1),
but followed by a sigmoid (instead of ReLU) activation, defined in Keras as
Activation(sigmoid).
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